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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper demonstrates how financial leverage impacts firm investment and 
the extent to which this relationship is conditional on the level of information asymmetry 
as well as growth. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper relies on data from 2403 Indian firms during 
the period 1995–2014, generating a total of 19,544 firm-year observations. Analysis is 
conducted by using various panel econometric techniques.  
 
Findings: Drawing insights from agency theories, the paper uncovers that financial 
leverage is negatively and significantly related to firm investment. It is also observed 
that the impact of financial leverage on firm investment is significant for high 
information asymmetric firms. Finally, the paper shows that the relationship between 
leverage and firm investment is significant for low-growth firms. However, no 
significant relationship is found between leverage and investment for high-growth firms.  
 
Originality/value: This paper provides fresh evidence on the leverage-investment nexus 
and, to the authors’ knowledge, it the first paper to examine the extent to which this 
leverage-investment relationship is driven by the level of information asymmetry.    
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1. Introduction  
This paper provides a new contribution to the existing literature by examining the effect of 
firm leverage on investment with a specific focus on Indian firms. It also distinctively 
examines the extent to which the leverage-investment relationship is driven by the level 
of information asymmetry as well as firm growth. The analyses are conducted and the 
results interpreted within a classic agency theoretical framework.  
The central proposition of Modigliani and Miller’s (hereafter MM) (1958) seminal work is 
that, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, capital structure is irrelevant to firm 
value and hence a firm’s financing and investment decisions are independent. This means that 
firm managers could not maximise the value of their firms by altering the debt-equity mix. 
Thus, in the view of MM (1958), a firm with profitable investment opportunities could still 
obtain the external funds required regardless of the state of its financial position. Subsequent 
developments, however, suggest that a firm’s capital structure is essentially relevant as 
finance affects real investment decisions. For instance, Myers (1977) shows that firms with 
more debt service are likely to have their positive net present value (NPV) projects go 
unfunded because of the issue of debt overhang created by prior debt financing. 
Consequently, this suggests that the leverage level of a firm matters in its investment 
decision. In respect of this, a significant number of studies (e.g. Bradley et al., 1984; Friend 
and Lang, 1988; Denis and Denis, 1993; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Lang et al., 1996; 
Cleary, 1999; Aivazian et al., 2005a; Cleary, 2006) have been devoted to examining the 
leverage-investment relationship. However, these empirical studies are heavily biased to data 
originating in developed nation settings, ignoring potential variations in the investment 
outcome of financial leverage in firms located in less developed markets. Given this gap, it is 
therefore important to probe the leverage-investment relationship in the context of an 
emerging market such as India. Thus, by relying on large-scale data from over 2400 firms, 
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this study offers a fresh insight into the leverage-investment relationship from the context of 
an emerging economy – India. Our work is closely  related in spirit, though distinct from 
prior studies (e.g. Aivazian et al., 2005 and Ahn et al., 2006) in one major respect: we argue 
on the basis of prior scholarly works (e.g. Lang et al., 1996) that management chooses 
leverage based on its private information about the firm’s future growth opportunities. Thus, 
as a way of extension, the paper assesses the extent to which the leverage-investment 
relationship is conditional on the level of information asymmetry. Consistent with other 
empirical works (e.g. Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 2005;d Ahn et al., 2006), the results 
indicate that leverage is negatively related to firm investment and significantly stronger for 
high information asymmetric firms. Moreover, it is observed that this negative effect is also 
significantly stronger for low-growth firms than for high-growth firms.   
The paper contributes to the finance literature in the following ways. First, by relying on data 
from India, it is among the first to examine the leverage-investment nexus outside the context 
of a developed market. By so doing, it demonstrates that the leverage-investment relationship 
evident in the developed context is also applicable in the context of an emerging market. 
Second, despite the burgeoning managerial and academic interest in capital structure issues, 
scholarly research is yet to examine if information asymmetry drives the leverage-investment 
relationship. Given this, the paper extends extant knowledge on the financial leverage-
investment relationship by showing how the relationship is shaped by degrees of information 
asymmetry. By relying on analysts’ forecast properties, the paper demonstrates that leverage 
is negatively related to investment and that this negative effect is significantly stronger for 
high information asymmetric firms. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine this.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 provides a brief background of the 
study; section 3 examines relevant literature and its theoretical underpinnings; section 4 
discusses the sample, empirical design and measurement of variables; section 5 presents the 
regression results and discussion; finally, section 6 provides a summary of the findings and 
concludes the study. 
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2. Background of study 
An overview of the unique features of India’s economic, financial and investment structure 
puts this paper into perspective. In India, there has been continuously rapid economic growth 
over the last three decades, for instance, the institutionalisation of the 1991 financial 
liberalisation reforms which over time gradually opened up the sector through interest 
deregulation and easing of restrictions on capital flows (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997a, b; 
Kumbhakar et al., 2003; Ataullah et al., 2004; Shanmugam and Das, 2004). As early as 
1992/93, the Central Bank of India (the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)) instituted guidelines 
for the establishment of Joint Ventures (JVs) and Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) by 
Indian corporations abroad. In 1997/98, policies regarding Indian investment overseas were 
liberalised, allowing mutual funds and fund managers registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (i.e. the stock market regulator) to undertake investment 
opportunities in foreign markets within an overall capital restriction of USD 500m. 
Subsequently, restrictions regarding the specific use of external funds raised under external 
commercial borrowing regulations by firms were lessened. By the early 2000s, Indian firms 
were granted authority to acquire foreign firms and/or make direct investment in other 
countries/economies through Joint Ventures (JVs) and Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (WOS). 
Indian firms were also permitted to invest up to 100% (rather than the prior ceiling of 50%) 
of their American Depository Receipts/Global Depository Receipts (ADR/GDR) proceeds for 
acquisitions of foreign corporations and direct investments in Joint Ventures (JVs) and 
Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries (WOS). These reforms also facilitated an upsurge in financial 
innovations in the financial sector, ensuring that Indian firms have better availability, access 
and freedom to choose debt instruments suitable to their investment and funding needs 
(Jadiyappa et al., 2016). Hence, blue-chip firms borrowed significantly in foreign markets in 
order to support their investment projects. Firms preferred borrowing from foreign markets 
due to the relatively low cost associated (i.e. low interest rates prevalent in foreign markets) 
(Sanyal and Shankar, 2011). Although the liberalisation was aimed at increasing firm 
performance and competition, the high preference created certain concerns which the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) has over time continued to stress, particularly regarding unhedged 
foreign currency exposures of Indian firms (Reserve Bank of India, 2002a, b; 2004). In spite 
of this significant economic progress, India’s financial sector is still dominated by an 
inefficient banking sector which results in significant misallocation of financial resources. In 
view of this, firm financing from non-bank and non-market sources (backed by non-legal 
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mechanisms) constitutes the main form of external finance for investment projects (Allen et 
al., 2012). Given this background, India presents a significant case example to investigate 
how leverage affects investment and the extent to which the leverage-investment relationship 
is driven by information asymmetry and growth.  
 
3. Related literature   
Myers (1977) introduced the principal-agent model which highlights the potential interactions 
between growth opportunities, information asymmetry and leverage. He indicated that, given 
the presence of agency conflicts, especially for high-growth firms with risky debts, firm 
managers may pass up positive NPV projects. The motivation for this decision is to avoid 
payoffs from the positive NPV projects accruing to debtholders rather than to shareholders 
and managers (Biddle et al., 2009). The consequence of this decision is the underinvestment 
bias or debt-overhang problem. The more growth opportunities available to a firm, the greater 
the extent of underinvestment biases the firm encounters. To mitigate these problems, a firm 
anticipating an increase in valuable growth opportunities must lessen its leverage capacity 
(Myers, 1977). Lessening a firm’s leverage capacity could be achieved either through debt 
covenants
4
 or shortening the maturity structure of debt
5
 to lower the cost of risky 
underinvestment problems. Thus, the underinvestment hypothesis postulates that firms that 
exhibit high growth potential should avoid debt financing ex-ante purposely to mitigate any 
conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders. This will consequently control for 
the ‘debt overhang’ problems and any ensuing underinvestment incentives (Myers, 1977). On 
the other hand, Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) contend that, given the availability of large 
free cash flows, particularly for low-growth firms, the use of leverage may serve as a vehicle 
of discipline for managers, hence inducing managers to invest free cash flows solely in 
projects that earn returns above the company's cost of capital rather than overinvesting in 
risky projects. Overinvestment results in the lock-up of a firm’s funds in idle fields of 
production capacity, consequently resulting in wastage of scarce resources and reduction in 
                                                          
4
 Debt covenants serve as an alternative means of controlling for underinvestment problems. See Smith and 
Warner (1979) and Demiroglu and James (2010) for an assessment of debt covenants; Nash et al. (2003), Billett 
et al. (2007) and Chava and Roberts (2008) for an empirical study of the role of debt covenants on investment. 
5
 The use of short-term debt with expiration/maturity date due before the implementation of an investment 
project entitles a firm’s shareholders and managers to the full benefit to be accrued from the new project. This 
can be achieved through renegotiation of debt contracts between shareholders/managers and debtholders, hence 
mitigating the adverse underinvestment biases (Dang, 2011). 
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firm value. Hence, Stulz (1990) contends that managers will be induced to invest too much 
when cash flow is high and too little when cash flow is low.  
According to Aivazian et al. (2005a), the structure of anticipations regarding future growth 
opportunities and any associated costs of re-contracting are both vital in examining the effect 
of leverage and debt maturity on firm investment. This is because unanticipated growth 
opportunities reduce the scope for mitigating underinvestment problems. Renegotiations with 
debtholders tend to become very time consuming and thus costlier compared to when growth 
opportunities are anticipated. Moreover, when growth is unanticipated, negotiations may 
require rapid completion before the growth opportunities disappear via competition. 
Consequently, the anticipation of growth opportunities and the renegotiation costs are 
adversely related, thus implying that long-term debt has a highly significant adverse effect on 
firm investment when growth opportunities are unanticipated compared to when they are 
anticipated. This is because, in the case of the former, adjustment costs of debt are higher. 
Hence, a low-leverage and/or short-term debt maturity strategy create room for more growth 
options to be taken, resulting in a higher level of investment (Dang, 2011). Put simply, 
reducing a firm’s leverage and/or shortening its debt maturity are expected to increase the 
positive impact of growth opportunities on investment. 
Following the above discussion, several pieces of recent empirical evidence advocate that the 
attempt to rebalance a firm’s capital structure to its optimal level is generally subjected to 
significant adjustment costs (see Betker, 1997; Fama and French, 2002; Leary and Roberts, 
2005). Therefore, Dang (2011) suggests that a firm is better off without adjustments to 
leverage and debt maturity when related costs exceed lost underinvestment benefits. 
Likewise, when the cost of the liquidity risk associated with short-term debt outweighs the 
mitigated cost of underinvestment problems, firms will have fewer incentives to shorten their 
debt maturity. Hence, transaction costs and liquidity risk may restrict and prevent firms from 
fully adjusting their leverage and debt maturity structure, consequently leading to 
underinvestment ex-post. 
However, the financial flexibility hypothesis contends that, due to the existence of imperfect 
markets or market frictions such as adverse selection (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or transaction 
costs (Leary and Roberts, 2005), high-growth firms will strategically opt for low debt levels 
with large cash reserves in order to preserve their borrowing capacity for future investment 
opportunities (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Almeida et al., 2004; Gamba and Triantis, 2008; 
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Harford et al., 2009; de Jong et al., 2012; Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2014). In addition, Eisfeldt 
and Rampini (2009) contend that, in an attempt to sustain flexibility, firms would be more 
likely to utilise lease financing instead of relying on external financing for procurement of 
assets. Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2014) suggest that highly flexible firms in particular have 
greater ability to undertake investment opportunities and also exhibit better performance 
levels compared to less flexible firms during crisis periods. Thus, both the underinvestment 
hypothesis (Myers, 1977) and financial flexibility hypotheses (Marchica and Mura, 2010; 
Denis, 2011; Denis and McKeon, 2012) suggest that firms strategically have zero leverage 
structures in order to preserve financial flexibility and alleviate investment distortions (Dang, 
2013). Nevertheless, the financial flexibility hypothesis additionally highlights the vital role 
of cash reserves as a mechanism for enhancing a firm’s investment ability. 
Extant literature demonstrates how leverage relates to firm investment. To begin with, 
Fazzari et al. (1988), Hoshi et al. (1991), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Lamont (1997) 
provide evidence to show that there is a positive relationship between internal cash flow and 
investment and that the relationship is significant particularly for firms experiencing 
significant barriers to external funds. Scandizzo (2005) confirms this finding and further 
indicates that the significant relationship between internal cash flow and investment is 
particularly applicable to innovative firms. Similarly, Denis and Denis (1993) also 
demonstrate that an increase in a firm’s financial leverage is accompanied by a significant 
decrease in its capital expenditure (investment). Lang et al. (1996) also analyse the nexus 
between leverage and firm investment, relying on a sample period between 1970 and 1989. 
By controlling for sales, growth (Tobin’s Q) and cash flow, the evidence indicates that 
leverage has a significant but negative impact on a firm’s investment. Aivazian et al. (2005a) 
also demonstrate that leverage has a negative and significant impact on investment decisions 
of public Canadian firms. Similarly, Firth et al. (2008) observe a negative relationship 
between investment and leverage for Chinese listed firms. In a similar vein, Ahn et al. (2006) 
also investigate the impact of leverage on investment in diversified firms in the United States 
and observe a negative impact of firm leverage on investment. 
Other empirical extensions in the literature (e.g. Oliner and Rudebusch, 1992; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995; Kadapakkam et al., 1998) also focus on examining the nexus between 
information asymmetry and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Degryse and De Jong (2006) 
posit that the magnitude of information asymmetry biases and any resulting underinvestment 
biases depend on certain firm-level features (e.g. information sensitivity of an industry and 
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bank-firm relationships). Hoshi et al. (1991) introduce information asymmetry and 
overinvestment problems explicitly by distinguishing between firms with low and high 
investment opportunities. They conclude that overinvestment problems are typically less 
relevant for firms with high growth opportunities. Along similar lines, a more recent 
extension of the literature by Nahar et al. (2016) and Song (2014) observe that superior 
accounting policy leads to a reduction of information asymmetry. Thus, the reduction of 
information asymmetry should have significant effect on cost of capital and investment 
decision.  
However, on the whole, research on the leverage-investment relationship and the extent to 
which this relationship is driven by the level of information asymmetry and firm growth in 
this context of emerging economies is scant to date. In response, this paper provides new 
evidence on this, specifically highlighting the extent to which this relationship is shaped 
by the level of information asymmetry as well as firm growth.  
 
4. Methodology   
4.1. Data and variables 
Annual financial data was obtained for 2403 Indian firms from the DataStream database for 
the period 1995-2013. In all, a total number of 19,544 of unbalanced firm-year observations 
were used in the regression analyses. Variables used in this study were chosen in line with the 
extant literature. The dependent variable is investment (INV). The independent variables are 
Overall Leverage (LEV) and Long-term Leverage (LTLev). Also, the paper controls for a 
number of firm-specific variables. These control variables are firm size (SZ), asset tangibility 
(TAN), return on assets (ROA), firm growth (GR), liquidity (LIQ) and non-debt tax shield 
(NDTS). Also, analysts’ forecast data for measuring information asymmetry was obtained 
from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) International database. All variables 
are winsorised at a 5% level on either tail to mitigate the effect of outliers. A summary of the 
variables used and their descriptions are presented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
The summary statistics of the variables used in this study are presented in Table 2. The 
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average value of firm investment (INV) is 0.30 and has a standard deviation of 0.33. This 
variable has a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 1.27, signifying a high degree 
of heterogeneity. Also, the average value of overall leverage (LEV) is 0.31. This low figure 
may reflect the fact that Indian firms are mainly equity financed. The average value of long-
term leverage is 0.19 and has a standard deviation of 0.17. Firm size (SZ) has a mean value of 
14.77 and a standard deviation of 1.60. This variable has a minimum and maximum value of 
11.89 and 17.81 respectively, signifying a fair degree of heterogeneity. It is further observed 
that the average performance of firms investigated (as measured by ROA) is 0.06, with a 
standard deviation of 0.08. This variable has a minimum value of -0.11 and a maximum value 
of 0.22. This suggests that some of the firms investigated experienced a negative 
performance. It is also observed that firm growth (GR) has a mean value of 0.20 and a 
standard deviation of 0.333. This variable has a minimum value of -0.36 and a maximum 
value of 1.04. This suggests that some of the firms investigated experienced a negative 
growth during the period under observation.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
In relation to Table 3, the paper investigates whether the independent variables employed are 
likely to suffer from collinearity problems. First, it can be observed that the correlation 
between the two independent variables (Lev and LTLev) is very high (0.82). This suggests 
that both variables are capturing a similar aspect. However, this poses no concerns about 
multicollinearity as both variables enter the regression model alternatively. It can also be seen 
that the correlation (but not necessarily the causal relationship) between the dependent (INV) 
and independent variables (LEV, LTLev) is negative. In relation to the control variables, the 
correlation among them reveals there is no multicollinearity issue. In general, the findings 
from both tables 2 and 3 indicate that none of the variables suffer from any serious bias that is 
likely to plague the regression results.   
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4.3. Estimation method 
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In this section, the empirical models are formulated to test the relationships described in 
section 1 above. The baseline regression model is formulated as: 
 
  1,1,,   tittiti XINV                             (1) 
Where INV (Investment) is the measure of firm investment (as defined in Table 1 above), X is 
the matrix of the independent and control variables also previously referenced and defined in 
Table 1,  is the composite error term which includes the time-invariant firm-fixed effects 
and an independently and identically distributed component with mean zero: 
11,   titi                                                                                                               (2) 
To test the relationship between the dependent (INV) and independent variables (Lev and 
LTLev), each of the independent variables enters the regression equation alternatively.  
The models, Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), can be estimated using OLS. However, this estimation 
approach fails to control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, leading to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 246). Thus, a practical approach in dealing with 
this is to adopt a panel fixed-effects or random-effects estimation method. Using the 
Hausman test, it can be confirmed that the fixed-effects (FE) models are most appropriate to 
account for the firm-level heterogeneity. Hence, the analysis is based on the panel fixed-
effects models and the pooled OLS is used for robustness checks. In order to control for 
possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms, the paper adjusts the standard 
errors of the regression coefficients by using the Huber-White approach and clustering at the 
firm level. Finally, in order to isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality 
between dependent and independent variables, the paper follows the existing literature (e.g. 
Danso and Adomako, 2014; Zou and Xiao, 2006) and lags the explanatory variables by one 
period.  
 
5. Results and Discussion  
This section presents the paper’s estimation results: first, the results for the baseline models, 
where firm investment (INV) is explained by the two independent variables (Lev and LTLev). 
This result is presented in Table 4. This is followed up by checking the robustness of the 
results (Tables 5 and 6). Next, the section examines the extent to which information 
11 
 
asymmetry matters in the leverage-investment relationship (Table 7). Finally, it looks at how 
firm growth impacts on the leverage-firm investment relationship (Table 8). 
 
5.1. Leverage and firm investment 
The baseline results are presented in Table 4. Two main estimation methods are used, OLS 
and fixed-effects models. Models 1-2 and 5-6 are based on OLS whilst the remaining models 
(i.e. 3-4 and 7-8) are based on fixed effects. A Hausman specification test is performed, and it 
provides support for the fixed-effects estimation. Thus, the results are discussed using the 
fully specified fixed-effects model estimations. The discussion starts with model 4, where 
overall leverage (LEV) is negatively and significantly related to firm investment (INV). The 
coefficient of this variable is -0.049 and has a standard deviation of 0.21. This suggests that a 
one standard deviation increase in LEV is associated with a 1.03% decrease in firm 
investment (INV). This finding is generally consistent with the view that capital structure 
plays an important role in the investment decisions of firms. Higher leverage levels lead to 
higher cost of future financing for firms, thus supporting Jensen’s (1986) agency cost of free 
cash flow hypothesis and Myers’ (1977) argument that leverage creates potential 
underinvestment incentives particularly for highly levered firms. This confirms other 
empirical findings (e.g. Lang et al., 1996; Aivazian et al., 2005b; Ahn et al., 2006). With 
regard to the long-term leverage (LTLev), the paper finds that the coefficient of the variable, 
as indicated by model 8 (i.e. the fully specified FE model), is negative and significant at the 
1% level. Based on this result, a one standard deviation increase in LTLev is associated with 
a 0.66% decrease in firm investment, thus indicating that LTLev (which is the most stable 
part of overall debt) also decreases firm investment.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
 
Turning to the control variables, the paper finds that firm size (SZ), asset tangibility (TAN) 
and non-debt tax shield (NDTS) have negative and significant effects across all models. 
However, Return on assets (ROA) and Liquidity (LIQ) have positive significant effects on 
investment. Growth (GR) positively affects investment, although this effect is insignificant.  
  
 12 
 
5.2. Robustness check  
5.2.1. Using an alternative measure of firm investment  
The results obtained so far are based on firm investment defined as ratio of net capital 
expenditure (capital expenditure minus depreciation) of firm i to total assets for the current 
year (Firth et al., 2008). This section assesses the sensitivity of the results to an alternative 
measure of firm investment defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to the start-of-period 
net property, plant and equipment (Chava, and Roberts, 2008). The results of this are 
presented in Table 5. It can be observed from the results that the signs on the coefficients of 
the two independent variables (Lev and LTLev) do not change. In general, the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficients of the independent variables in the fully specified fixed-effects 
models remains negative and significant for both LEV and LTLev. This is a confirmation of 
the findings reported in Tables 4. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
5.2.2. Leverage and firm investment – GMM estimation 
Until now, the paper has documented that LEV and LTLev have a negative and significant 
impact on firm investment. At this stage, the robustness of the results is probed by addressing 
the potential endogeneity problems that are likely to plague the findings. Such problems may 
arise from possible reverse causality between leverage and firm investment. Although lagged 
values were used for the independent variables in the models to mitigate such simultaneity 
bias, the paper follows existing literature (e.g. Ozkan, 2001; Fosu, 2013) to fully address the 
simultaneity issues and omitted variable bias in respect of leverage, and re-estimates all the 
models using the 2-step Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) technique. The result of 
this is presented in Table 6
6
.  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
                                                          
6 The results in Table 6 confirm that that the instruments are valid and relevant: the Hansen J-statistics p-values 
are all in excess of 0.1, suggesting that the over-identifying restrictions are valid (see Baum, Schaffer, & 
Stillman, 2003). 
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It can be observed from the GMM results that the signs and magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients remain similar to what is already reported in tables 4 and 5 above. For instance, 
both LEV and LTlev (as reported in tables 4 and 5) are negative and significant at the 1% 
level. This is similar to what is reported in the GMM estimation in Table 6. This shows that 
the main results reported in Table 4 above are robust with respect to an alternative 
econometric model.  
 
5.3. Leverage and firm investment: the role of information asymmetry 
One way to extend extant knowledge on the financial leverage-investment relationship is to 
examine how the relationship is shaped by degrees of information asymmetry. The authors’ 
position is that, given that firms have private information regarding the quality of their 
investment projects, this creates incentives for adverse selection and capital rationing. 
Basically, the presence of private information has implications for the cost of capital and thus 
subsequent investment decisions (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, to 
examine the role of information asymmetry in the leverage-investment relationship, the paper 
follows the analyst forecast properties literature (e.g. Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Drobetz et 
al., 2010; Fosu et al., 2016) and measures the information asymmetry using dispersion of 
analyst forecast. Specifically, the information asymmetry is computed as the standard 
deviation of analysts’ forecast earnings per share for the fiscal year. The sample firms are 
then split into quantiles where the firms in the top one-third quantile of the standard deviation 
of analysts’ forecast earnings per share for the fiscal year are marked as high information 
asymmetric firms, whilst those in the bottom one-third quantile are marked as low 
information asymmetric firms. The results of this are presented in Table 7 and variation can 
be observed in the leverage-investment relationship for low and high information asymmetric 
firms. Indeed, evidence obtained indicates that both LEV and LTLev are not significantly 
related to investment for firms with low information asymmetry. In contrast, both LEV and 
LTLev are negatively and significantly related to firms with high information asymmetry. 
This indicates that leverage constrains investment more in firms that have higher information 
asymmetry. Therefore, firms with a higher level of information asymmetry would choose a 
lower level of leverage to avoid underinvestment problems.  
[Table 7 about here] 
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5.4. Leverage and firm investment: the role of firm growth 
 This sub-section extends the baseline model presented in section 3.3 by examining the extent 
to which firm growth matters in the leverage-investment relationship. To do this, the authors 
follow Fosu et al. (2016) and use one-year growth rate of sales as a proxy for firm growth and 
split the sample firms into quantiles where the firms in the top one-third quantile of the one-
year growth rate of sales are marked as high-growth firms, whilst those in the bottom one-
third quantile are marked as low-growth firms. The results of this are presented in Table 8. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
First, the results are consistent with and complementary to the main findings that leverage 
and firm investment are negatively related. However, it is worth noting that the impact of 
both LEV and LTLev on INV is insignificant for high-growth firms. In the case of low-
growth firms, the coefficients for both LEV and LTLev are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. With regard to LEV, a standard deviation increase leads to a 1.02% reduction in firm 
investment, whilst, for LTLev, a standard deviation increase is associated with up to a 1.22% 
reduction in investment. The result indicates that, whilst high-growth firms vigorously 
attempt to lessen leverage to moderate biases, the decrease in agency cost of risky debt 
overhang may be trivial in magnitude, hence restricting their ability to pursue more valuable 
growth opportunities ex post (Tsuruta, 2015). Thus, for low-growth firms, leverage may limit 
the effective actualisation of investment opportunities. The results are broadly consistent with 
Aivazian et al. (2005b).  
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6. Conclusion  
Using a large dataset from 2403 Indian firms, this paper documents the leverage-investment 
relationship and the extent to which this relationship is driven by the level of information 
asymmetry as well as growth. The investigation provides important insights into the extent to 
which firm investment is driven by leverage. The evidence obtained suggests that both 
overall leverage (LEV) and long-term leverage (LTLev) exert a negative effect on firm 
investment. The robustness of this result is verified by an alternative definition of firm 
investment as well as using a different econometric technique (GMM). The study provides 
support for a study of Canadian firms by Aivazian et al. (2005b). Going beyond this, it also 
shows that both information asymmetry and growth matter in this leverage-investment 
relationship. Specifically, the paper observes that, for high information asymmetric firms, the 
leverage-investment relationship is negative and significant. However, no significant 
relationship is found for low information asymmetric firms. In the case of growth, the paper 
documents that the leverage-investment relationship is positive and significant for low-
growth firms.  
To conclude, this study provides new insights into the leverage-investment relationship and 
the role of information asymmetry and firm growth. It will be interesting and useful to extend 
this research to test how this relationship matters across industrial lines. This is something 
that could be looked at in future research.  
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Table 1: Description of variables  
Dependent Variable Description  Literature  
Firm Investment (INV) Ratio of net capital 
expenditure (capital 
expenditure minus 
depreciation) of firm i to total 
assets for the current year 
Firth et al. (2008) 
Independent Variables 
Overall Leverage (LEV)  
 
Ratio of total debt to total 
assets  
 
Chen (2004), Chava and 
Roberts (2008), Chen et al. 
(2010) 
Long-Term Leverage (LTLev) 
Ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets 
Chen (2004) 
Control Variables 
Firm size (SZ) Log of total assets 
Fosu et al. (2016), Qian and 
Yeung (2015) 
Asset tangibility (TAN) 
Ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets 
 
Qian and Yeung (2015), 
Danso and Adomako (2014) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Ratio of total operating profit 
plus depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA) to 
total assets 
Fosu (2013) 
Firm growth (GR) 
The one-year growth rate of 
sales 
Fosu et al. (2016), Fosu 
(2013) 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
Ratio of current assets to 
current liabilities 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
None Debt Tax Shield 
(NDTS) 
Ratio of depreciation expense 
to total assets 
Danso and Adomako (2014), 
Zhang and Kanazaki  (2007) 
This table presents the description of all the variables used. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 .        
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 25
th
% 50
th
%   75
th
%   Obs. 
INV 0.30 0.33 0.00 1.27 0.06 0.18 0.40 18377  
LEV 0.31 0.21 0.00 0.71 0.12 0.31 0.46 19544  
LTLev 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.57 0.03 0.14 0.30 19541  
SZ 14.77 1.60 11.89 17.81 13.57 14.74 15.89 19559  
TAN 0.37 0.21 0.04 0.74 0.20 0.36 0.53 19514  
ROA 0.06 0.08 -0.11 0.22 0.01 0.07 0.11 19459  
GR 0.20 0.33 -0.36 1.04 0.01 0.16 0.34 16893  
LIQ 1.86 1.26 0.56 5.75 1.11 1.44 2.09 19425  
NDTS 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 19446  
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises 2403 Indian firms over the 
period 1995 to 2013. The variable descriptions are provided in Table 1 above. 
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Table 3: Correlations matrix 
          
 INV LEV LTLev SZ TAN ROA GR LIQ NDTS 
INV 1.00         
          
LEV -0.15
***
 1.00        
          
LTLev -0.11
***
 0.82
***
 1.00       
          
SZ -0.03
***
 0.14
***
 0.16
***
 1.00      
          
TAN -0.24
***
 0.43
***
 0.49
***
 0.13
***
 1.00     
          
ROA 0.28
***
 -0.28
***
 -0.23
***
 0.15
***
 -0.08
***
 1.00    
          
GR 0.26
***
 -0.01 0.02
***
 0.05
***
 -0.06
***
 0.29
***
 1.00   
          
LIQ 0.16
***
 -0.35
***
 -0.12
***
 -0.22
***
 -0.28
***
 0.08
***
 0.04
***
 1.00  
          
NDTS -0.12
***
 0.17
***
 0.20
***
 -0.01 0.46
***
 -0.05
***
 -0.10
***
 -0.16
***
 1.00 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the data. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1.   
***
 indicates significance at 1% or better  
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Table 4: Regression results for the full sample period – Dependent variable = INV  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS  OLS FE FE OLS  OLS FE FE 
LEV -0.001 0.004 -0.099
***
 -0.049
***
     
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)     
         
LTLev     0.017
***
 0.006 -0.075
***
 -0.039
***
 
     (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
         
SZ  0.003
***
  -0.013
***
  0.003
***
  -0.013
***
 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.002) 
         
TAN  0.080
***
  -0.027
***
  0.079
***
  -0.026
***
 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.009) 
         
ROA  0.195
***
  0.133
***
  0.195
***
  0.144
***
 
  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
         
GR  0.022
***
  0.002  0.022
***
  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
         
LIQ  0.005
***
  0.005
***
  0.005
***
  0.007
***
 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
NDTS  -0.519
***
  -0.788
***
  -0.520
***
  -0.807
***
 
  (0.045)  (0.076)  (0.045)  (0.075) 
         
_cons 0.082
***
 -0.068
***
 0.056
***
 0.258
***
 0.078
***
 -0.063
***
 0.036
***
 0.254
***
 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.028) (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.028) 
N 18199 15492 18199 15492 18197 15491 18197 15491 
r2 0.045 0.175 0.106 0.144 0.047 0.175 0.087 0.141 
N_clust 2367 2296 2367 2296 2367.000 2296 2367 2296 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates 
significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 5: Regression results using an alternative measure of firm investment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS  OLS FE FE OLS  OLS FE FE 
LEV -0.234
***
 0.052
***
 -0.530
***
 -0.169
***
     
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.026) (0.029)     
         
LTLev     -0.242
***
 0.089
***
 -0.437
***
 -0.101
***
 
     (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.031) 
         
SZ  0.004
*
  -0.096
***
  0.003  -0.098
***
 
  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.009) 
         
TAN  -0.348
***
  -0.663
***
  -0.364
***
  -0.669
***
 
  (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.021)  (0.044) 
         
ROA  0.783
***
  0.531
***
  0.794
***
  0.578
***
 
  (0.043)  (0.055)  (0.042)  (0.054) 
         
GR  0.165
***
  0.042
***
  0.163
***
  0.041
***
 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
         
LIQ  0.023
***
  0.023
***
  0.020
***
  0.028
***
 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
         
NDTS  0.334
*
  -1.861
***
  0.321  -1.927
***
 
  (0.199)  (0.323)  (0.199)  (0.322) 
         
_cons 0.499
***
 0.202
***
 0.373
***
 1.964
***
 0.348
***
 0.226
***
 0.272
***
 1.965
***
 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.009) (0.151) (0.017) (0.037) (0.007) (0.150) 
N 18364 15694 18364 15694 18362 15693 18362 15693 
r2 0.070 0.200 0.112 0.191 0.064 0.201 0.093 0.189 
N_clust 2357 2291 2357 2291 2357 2291 2357 2291 
This table presents the OLS and FE estimation results for the full sample period. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 1.  
⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 6: Investment determinants: 2-STEP GMM 
 (1) (2)  
LEV -0.072
***
  
 (0.024)  
   
LTLev  -0.101
***
 
  (0.029) 
   
SZ -0.014
***
 -0.013
**
 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
   
TAN -0.133
***
 -0.114
***
 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
   
ROA 0.202
***
 0.201
***
 
 (0.059) (0.055) 
   
GR 0.024
*
 0.024
*
 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
   
LIQ 0.017
***
 0.022
***
 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
   
NDTS -0.078 -0.151 
 (0.298) (0.303) 
N 8548 8547 
No. of firms 1840 1840 
K-P WF Stats 4.872 4.783 
K-P LM stats 91.857 89.835 
Hansen J statistic 33.025 34.987 
Hansen J p-value 0.003 0.001 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates 
significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 7 Regression results for the firm-level determinants of investment: the role of information 
asymmetry  
 Low information asymmetric firms   High information asymmetric firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 FE FE  FE FE 
LEV -0.043   -0.048
***
  
 (0.033)   (0.007)  
      
LTLev  -0.055   -0.037
***
 
  (0.044)   (0.007) 
      
SZ -0.003 -0.003  -0.013
***
 -0.013
***
 
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.002) 
      
TAN -0.029 -0.024  -0.030
***
 -0.030
***
 
 (0.040) (0.040)  (0.009) (0.009) 
      
ROA 0.157
**
 0.156
**
  0.129
***
 0.139
***
 
 (0.068) (0.068)  (0.012) (0.012) 
      
GR 0.008 0.009  0.002 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.002) (0.002) 
      
LIQ 0.002 0.003  0.005
***
 0.007
***
 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) 
      
NDTS -1.063
***
 -1.071
***
  -0.795
***
 -0.814
***
 
 (0.305) (0.302)  (0.077) (0.077) 
      
_cons 0.111 0.101  0.246
***
 0.242
***
 
 (0.123) (0.125)  (0.027) (0.026) 
N 795 795  14697 14697 
r2 0.213 0.214  0.144 0.140 
N_clust 374 374  2295 2295 
Standard errors in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates 
significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 8: Regression results for impact of leverage on investment: low vs. high-growth firms 
 Low-growth firms  High-growth firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 FE FE  FE FE 
LEV  -0.035
***
   -0.022  
 (0.012)   (0.013)  
      
LTLev     -0.042
***
   -0.018 
  (0.014)   (0.015) 
      
SZ  -0.005 -0.005  -0.015
***
 -0.015
***
 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
      
TAN  -0.015 -0.013  -0.068
***
 -0.067
***
 
 (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.017) 
      
ROA  0.109
***
 0.112
***
  0.147
***
 0.150
***
 
 (0.025) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.030) 
      
GR  0.002 0.002  0.009 0.010 
 (0.010) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.006) 
      
LIQ  0.008
***
 0.009
***
  0.006
***
 0.007
***
 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
      
NDTS  -0.600
***
 -0.609
***
  -0.799
***
 -0.806
***
 
 (0.131) (0.131)  (0.165) (0.165) 
      
_cons 0.101
**
 0.093
*
  0.302
***
 0.299
***
 
 (0.051) (0.051)  (0.050) (0.050) 
N 3695 3695  3885 3884 
r2 0.121 0.122  0.167 0.167 
N_clust 1670  1670   1720  1720  
Standard errors in parentheses. All variable definitions are as described in Table 1. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates 
significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
 
